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NOTE: AN EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF
UNAUTHORIZED PROSECUTORIAL PROMISES OF
IMMUNITY
Pamela Hammers and James Stephens were jointly charged
with the murder of Cynthia Walker and with manslaughter for caus-
ing the death of Ms. Walker's unborn child. Hammers, as a result
of plea bargaining with the prosecuting attorney, agreed to waive
her privilege against self-incrimination and to testify against Ste-
phens. The prosecuting attorney agreed to move for a nolle prosequi
and to grant Hammers total immunity to the charges against her.
On the trial date Hammers was present in court and ready to testify,
but the case was continued on motion of the State. At this time
Hammers' attorneys confirmed with the prosecuting attorney the
existence of their agreement. Subsequently, Stephens changed his
plea from not guilty to guilty of second degree murder and agreed
to testify against Hammers. Hammers was then notified that the
prosecuting attorney was withdrawing from the immunity agree-
ment and would prosecute her on the charges of murder and man-
slaughter. Hammers had made a statement concerning the crimes
with which she and Stephens were charged. The prosecution re-
turned this statement, and it was erased from the tape on which it
was recorded. Hammers' motion to stay and to enjoin the prosecu-
tion on the basis of the immunity agreement was denied. No refer-
ence to the statement was made during her trial. She was found
guilty of second degree murder and sentenced to eight years' impris-
onment.'
The Arkansas Supreme Court found that since the immunity
agreement had not been approved by the trial court, it was not
enforceable on statutory grounds. It nevertheless held that Ham-
mers' claim was enforceable on equitable principles if the trial court
should find, after considering the terms of the agreement, that
Hammers had in good faith performed her part of the bargain.
Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977).
One of the prosecution's most important tools is the statutory
authority to grant immunity to a witness in order to secure the
benefit of the witness' testimony.' The origin of immunity grants
can be traced to the common law doctrine of approvement. Ap-
provement provided that a person indicted for treason or felony
might confess the truth of the charge and accuse another as his
1. Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 590-92, 550 S.W.2d 432, 434-35 (1977).
2. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-531 to -536 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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accomplice in order to obtain a pardon for himself.3 Later the Eng-
lish courts adopted a proceeding whereby an accomplice, after mak-
ing a full confession and giving evidence for the Crown, obtained an
equitable right to a recommendation of mercy.4
The first American immunity statute was enacted in 1857.1
Congress, recognizing the need to obtain testimony and still protect
the privilege against self-incrimination,' gave immunity to persons
testifying in a congressional inquiry. Since this enactment, Congress
and the state legislatures have utilized immunity legislation to miti-
gate the impact of the fifth amendment privilege.7
Inasmuch as immunity statutes generally operate in an area of
constitutional protection, the United States Supreme Court has
taken special care to weigh the sufficiency of such statutory grants.'
Traditionally, nothing short of complete immunity was deemed con-
stitutionally permissible and thus, until recent years, most of the
immunity statutes granted "transactional immunity."' Transac-
tional immunity precludes prosecution of a witness for or on account
of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which a witness
testifies. The witness is immunized from criminal liability for any
crime discussed in his testimony. Transactional immunity may not
be revoked, even though the testimony provided was not truthful,
but the lying witness may be prosecuted for perjury. In 1972, how-
ever, the United States Supreme Court held in Kastigar v. United
States'° that total immunity from prosecution is not required by the
fifth amendment. It was held that "use immunity,"" immunity
from the use of the compelled testimony and the fruits thereof, is
3. United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1879).
4. Id. at 600-01 (citing 2 T. Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence, and
Digest of Proofs, in Civil and Criminal Proceedings 15 (4th American ed. Philadelphia 1832)
(1st ed. London 1824)).
5. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, Ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155: "[N]o person examined and testifying
before either House of Congress, or any Committee of either House, shall be held to answer
criminally in any court of justice, or subject to any penalty or forfeiture for any fact or act
touching which he shall be required to testify.
6. U.S. Const. amend. V.
7. Id.
8. See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
9. For a full treatment of constitutional and statutory questions, see 51 B.U.L. Rev. 616
(1971).
10. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
11. "Use and derivative use" immunity prohibits only the use of the compelled evidence
and its fruits against the witness; thus, the witness may still be prosecuted for crimes referred
to in his compelled testimony if the subsequent prosecution is based on independently ob-
tained testimony. See id. at 448-59.
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sufficient to comply with the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination.
In the absence of specific statutory authority, both federal and
state courts have long held that although there is no legal right to
immunity, an accomplice who testifies for the prosecution has an
equitable claim to immunity. 2 The equitable principle is that if an
accomplice testifies fully and fairly, he will not be prosecuted for the
offense disclosed.
13
In several recent decisions, a promise of immunity made by the
prosecution has been enforced even though the particular agree-
ments were not made pursuant to applicable statutory provisions.
For example, a California appellate court in People v. Brunner4
used the contractual theory of estoppel to enforce a bargain made
by the prosecutor and the defendant. The defendant had been
promised immunity from prosecution if she would provide incrimi-
nating testimony about her involvement in a crime which would also
incriminate other members of a gang. The defendant gave her testi-
mony, even though the prosecutor had failed to comply with the
California immunity statute which required court approval of such
agreements. When, in a second trial, the defendant recanted her
testimony and claimed the fifth amendment privilege, she was in-
dicted for participation in the crime. The appellate court upheld the
lower court and enforced the bargain, reasoning that the defendant
had originally testified in reliance on the state's promise and that
the state had received substantially what it bargained for.
A federal district court in United States v. Paiva'5 enforced an
agreement wherein the defendant promised to cooperate with the
prosecution in exchange for immunity. The defendant refused to
provide information which was not required by the agreement and
the prosecutor indicted the defendant for the original offense. The
court dismissed the indictment and reasoned that the judiciary,
exercising its supervisory powers over the administration of justice,
may require the executive branch to adhere to the standard of fair
play. The Paiva court did not consider whether the promise was
within permissible authority, but rather held that the interest at
stake was the "[p]ublic confidence in the fair and honorable ad-
12. United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594 (1879); United States v. L~vy, 153 F. 2d 995 (3rd
Cir. 1946); Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1, 73 A. 637 (1909); Commonwealth v. St. John, 173 Mass.
566, 54 N.E. 254 (1899).
13. United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594 (1879); People v. Bryant, 409 Ill. 467, 100 N.E.2d
598 (1951); Camron v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 180, 22 S.W. 682 (1893).
14. 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973).




In United States v. Carter"7 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
explicitly held that an unauthorized promise of immunity by a fed-
eral prosecutor was binding upon the government. The court recog-
nized that immunity may ordinarily be granted only upon compli-
ance with federal statutory requirements, but it reasoned that where
the defendant has provided incriminating testimony because of
such a promise, the agreement may be enforced. 8 The court ordered
that if the promise were made, relied upon, and breached as alleged,
the indictment should be dismissed. 9
The United States Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York"0
concluded that when a plea bargain agreement is such that the plea
was induced by the prosecutor's promise, then the promise must be
kept.2' The defendant, after being indicted on two felony counts,
agreed to plead guilty to a lesser offense, provided the other felony
charges be dropped and the prosecutor not make a sentencing rec-
ommendation. At the sentencing hearing, a new prosecutor, appar-
ently ignorant of the agreement, recommended the maximum sent-
ence. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
the state court to determine whether specific performance of the
agreement or the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea should be
defendant's remedy.1
2
In Arkansas prior to 1973, when the legislature passed a general
immunity statute,23 the only immunity legislation had been statutes
dealing with particular narrow areas. One statute, for example, pro-
vided use immunity for an accomplice who testified before a grand
jury.24 Another granted use immunity to a defendant in a suit to
recover money lost by gaming or betting when the defendant an-
swered interrogatories propounded by the plaintiff. 2 However, there
was no statute governing general grants of immunity from prosecu-
tion to persons testifying in criminal matters. The 1973 Act was
16. Id. at 747 (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)).
17. 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974).
18. Id. at 427-28.
19. Id. at 428. Since the case before the court involved only the defendant's allegations
concerning the agreement, the judgment of conviction was vacated and the case remanded
for an evidentiary hearing.
20. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
21. -Id. at 262.
22. Id. at 262-63.
23. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-531 to -536 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
24. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-915 (RepI. 1967).
25. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-1607 to -1608 (Repl. 1962).
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passed for the purpose of establishing guidelines to facilitate prose-
cutions and to clarify the authority of the prosecuting attorney to
make such grants. The Act required that the prosecuting attorney
apply for and obtain a written order from the judge of the circuit
court approving any grant of immunity,
In the first Arkansas case addressing the problem of immunity,
Runnels v. State,"6 the court did not consider equitable principles
in reaching its decision. Runnels had been tried and convicted of
first degree murder. He moved for a new trial, claiming he had been
surprised by being put on trial after the State's attorney had prom-
ised him immunity from prosecution in exchange for his testimony.
There was no statutory provision for immunity; nevertheless, the
court held that it was within the discretion of the public prosecutor
to determine whether an accomplice should be permitted to become
"State's evidence" and whether, if he did, he was afterward entitled
to exemption from further prosecution by reason of his cooperation.
The court found no error in either the prosecution or the submission
of Runnels' confession to the jury. It was found that prosecutorial
discretion to deny immunity to an accomplice continued even after
the accomplice had testified. No mention was made of any supervi-
sory authority which might reside in the courts. Since Runnels there
apparently have been no reported cases addressing the question of
prosecutorial immunity grants.
In Hammers v. State7 the court held that a claimant was equi-
tably entitled to enforcement of an unauthorized immunity agree-
ment, provided that its terms were complied with in good faith. In
remanding the case, the court ordered the trial court to determine
what promises were made by the prosecutor and the extent of the
appellant's performance of the bargain. 8 Based upon these factual
determinations, the trial court was to decide whether Hammers was
entitled to relief on equitable principles.
29
Since the immunity agreement between Hammers and the pro-
secuting attorney was never approved by the trial court pursuant to
the 1973 Act,30 and since Hammers did not come within the terms
of any other Arkansas statute governing immunity, her claim had
to be viewed as one for relief on equitable rather than legal princi-
ples. 3 ' The court recognized that where no statute governs, there has
26. 28 Ark. 121 (1873).
27. 261 Ark. 585, 550 S.W.2d 432 (1977).
28. Id. at 605, 550 S.W.2d at 442.
29. Id.
30. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-531 to -536 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
31. Hammers v. State, 261 Ark. 585, 597-98, 550 S.W.2d 432, 438 (1977).
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long been an established practice of enforcing agreements to grant
immunity or sentencing consideration to an accomplice who testi-
fies fully in good faith for the prosecution." The court also recog-
nized that there was opposing authority holding that an agreement
for immunity made without the consent or advice of the trial court
was unenforceable.33 In considering the relief to be granted and the
means of obtaining such relief, the court found a wide divergence
of authority. 4
The court concluded that even when the prosecution opposes
enforcement of an agreement, it lies within the discretion of the trial
court to determine if there is an equitable claim to immunity.
5 If
the appellant has fulfilled the agreement in good faith, the court
should enforce it for reasons of public policy. Although the State
contended that the appellant had not acted in good faith, the court
held this charge had not been sustained by the evidence. The court
found that Hammers was at all times ready and willing to testify
for the State .3 Having thus established the basis for an equitable
right to immunity, the court directed that if the circuit court found
appellant entitled to relief on remand, the jury verdict should be set
aside and the charges dismissed.
37
The impact of Hammers is that it recognizes nonstatutory
immunity that is based on a doctrine of fairness and that the judici-
ary has the power to supervise and enforce. Although the court
recognized the principle that in the absence of statutory authority
no binding immunity agreement can be made, 38 it refused to apply
that rule inflexibly. This holding may be viewed as a policy decision
based on fairness to the defendant and on the knowledge that allow-
ing a prosecutor to revoke an agreement would affect the willingness
of other defendants to cooperate with the prosecution. A grant of
immunity is an aid to effective law enforcement, and for it to work
there must be an inducement to testify.
32. Id. at 595, 550 S.W.2d at 436.
33. Id. at 596, 550 S.W.2d at 437.
34. Id. at 597, 550 S.W.2d at 438. Remedies ranged from the agreement providing no
protection at all to permitting the agreement's use as a plea in bar.
35. Id. at 599, 550 S.W.2d at 439.
36. Id. at 593, 550 S.W.2d at 436.
37. Id. at 604-05, 550 S.W.2d at 442. The court commented several times on the "very
unsatisfactory record" in this case, but stated that in spite of this handicap, it would have
attempted a determination whether Hammers had carried the burden of proving the agree-
ment and her compliance, had the trial court ruled upon those matters. However, the trial
judge ruled simply that Hammers was not entitled to immunity because no agreement for it
had been approved by the court and because the State had not sought approval or moved for
a nolle prosequi.
38. Id. at 596, 550 S.W.2d at 437.
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The court's refusal to invalidate the unauthorized promise of
immunity might be criticized as a violation of a specific legislative
mandate. The legislature had established the procedure to be fol-
lowed for any grant of immunity to be made." It is arguable that
the court, in relaxing the necessity of fulfilling these requirements,
has ignored the legislative command. The decision, however, can be
justified on the basis of sound public policy. This is not a case of a
judicial grant of immunity; the grant did not originate by virtue of
the court's initiative. It is rather an exercise of the court's supervi-
sory power over prosecutorial conduct. Hammers seems to indicate
that the prosecution will not be protected from an unwise agree-
ment. Administrative questions of prosecutorial power to grant
immunity and of statutory requirements for the grant are out-
weighed by the state's interest in the fair administration of justice.
Immunity is a type of guilty plea where there is no adjudication
of guilt. By considering the prosecutor's promise of immunity as the
result of plea bargaining, an alternative rationale is available upon
which to rest this decision. In a plea bargain, as Santobello v. New
York40 has shown, the promise of the prosecution to recommend
leniency or reduction of charges is binding. The judiciary controls
the sentencing power and should require that a prosecutor's promise
which induces a plea be fulfilled. Immunity is the perfect or ulti-
mate plea bargain, as there is no sentence or probation involved.
Therefore, since grants of immunity call for no sentence by the
judiciary, and since the prosecutor's promise to recommend immun-
ity should be binding, the court, if applying plea bargain notions,
should be forced to validate the grant of immunity.
The decision in Hammers,4 on either of the conceptual bases
discussed, is a progressive treatment of unauthorized promises of
immunity and is in keeping with recent federal decisions. It is a
39. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 28-531 to -536 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
40. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
41. On remand the trial court ruled that Hammers was not entitled to relief on equita-
ble principles and reinstated her conviction. On a second appeal the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed and dismissed. With one justice dissenting, the court determined that the record
showed Hammers to be ready and willing to testify at all times. The court found the State
had made the bargain and had taken full advantage of it until after Stephens entered his
plea of guilty and promised to testify against Hammers. Thus, the court concluded that
Hammers was entitled to immunity on equitable principles and that the trial court had erred
in not so ruling. The necessity of obtaining a witness' testimony and the establishment of a
statewide standard upon which both defendants and prosecutors could rely were significant
public policy considerations contributing to the court's decision. Justice Fogleman registered
a vigorous dissent based on the fact that the court allowed de novo review in a criminal case!
Hammers v. State, 263 Ark. Adv. Sh. 378, 565 S.W.2d Adv. Sh. 406 (1978).
19781
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policy decision which should prove beneficial to all parties con-
cerned. In the future the prosecutor must weigh carefully the public
interest and the value of an offender's testimony before making any
promises. The defendant, knowing that the agreement will be en-
forced, will be more willing to bargain in hope of favorable treat-
ment, and the public faith will be preserved.
Sherry Perkins Bartley
